Président Hollande

Voilà some quick thoughts on François Hollande’s victory.

• It was totally predictable and expected by just about everyone. Some UMP partisans may have held out hope for a late Sarkozy surge that would put him over 50%—and who knows what Sarko was thinking himself—but UMP politicians and those who follow politics closely knew for some time that the carrots were cooked, and particularly after Wednesday night’s debate. They were all talking the talk but they knew Sarko was toast. The language—verbal and body—of all the UMP politicos on the TV plateaux this evening (it’s late night here) made it clear that they were not surprised. And they were quite gracious, BTW, as was Sarkozy himself in his concession speech at the Mutualité. No mauvaise humeur at the higher levels (though l’homme de l’ombre Patrick Buisson was nowhere to be seen and if Guillaume Peltier made an appearance I missed it). Even Le Figaro has been strikingly sportsmanlike in its coverage this evening. Everyone is taking the high road. There has been a fair amount of spontaneous bad humor by ordinary sarkozystes—as reflected on my and my daughter’s Facebook news feeds—but that’s normal. They’ll get over it.
• The Socialists are taking the high road too. They’re naturally thrilled by the victory—the party at the Bastille looks to be as large, if not even larger, than the one on May 10, 1981—but there’s no gloating. It’s sobriety and good sportsmanship all around. And Hollande’s speech in Tulle was good, striking the right notes.
• Hollande’s 51.7% score was sans appel but narrower than most expected. In view of Sarkozy’s deep unpopularity over the past four years—with his approval ratings in the 30s—the fact that he still received over 48% of the vote shows that the French right, even in the worst of times, remains strong. The right—with the center—is the natural majority in this country and with left victories in national elections happening only in exceptional moments (or when the right is split). Sarkozy’s relatively good score also signifies that his hard-right strategy was not totally ill-conceived, that it did succeed in mobilizing voters of the right, or in any case did not scare them away in droves. Sarkozy and Buisson may have been on to something here (I’ll come back to this later). No matter how execrable Sarkozy’s frontiste rhetoric may have been, a certain number of right-wing voters who disliked him were still willing to hold their noses and put his ballot in the envelope, as they like the left even less. If it hadn’t been for the detestable aspects of Sarkozy’s personality and style of rule, he likely would have been reelected and despite the economic crisis.
• This has some lessons for Hollande and the left as they get ready to take the reins of power. IMO Hollande needs to make it very clear that he will be looking to the center. He cannot and should not blow off the Front de Gauche—which should get a few ministries (e.g. la ville, logement, jeunesse et sports)—but a government that is markedly on the left will run into problems with public opinion (and may not even win the legislative elections). For this reason alone, appointing Martine Aubry as PM would be a very bad idea. Not that I think for a minute that Hollande will do so. Jean-Marc Ayrault or Manuel Valls would be the right choices for Matignon, as would Michel Sapin at Bercy. And it would be excellent if he could pick off a centrist or two, e.g. Jean-Louis Bourlanges at European Affairs. Hollande will certainly make good on his parité pledge, which will bring women like Marisol Touraine, Aurélie Filippetti, Anne Hidalgo, and Najat Belkacem into the government, as well as écolos like Cécile Duflot. Ça aurait de la gueule.
• I’m quite happy about Hollande’s victory, no doubt about it. Il fallait du changement, et maintenant.

I’ll have more to say about this in the coming days, when Hollande announces his first appointments and after I’ve had a chance to look over the detailed election results.