Yesterday I had a post taking apart putative GOP foreign policy heavyweight Marco Rubio’s critique of President Obama’s action in this domain, and notably in the Middle East. So now I come across an article in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, by the journal’s editor Gideon Rose, on Obama’s foreign policy record, which, Rose argues, is very largely positive.

The piece begins with the inevitable sports metaphor

How should one judge a president’s handling of foreign policy? Some focus on what happens in a few lonely moments of crisis, casting the nation’s leader as Horatius at the bridge or Casey at the bat. But a better analogy would be a member of a relay team or a middle relief pitcher: somebody who takes over from a predecessor, does a hard job for a while, and then passes things on to the next guy.

In baseball, there are special statistics used to judge such players, the hold and the blown save, which essentially tally whether the pitcher’s team keeps or loses the lead while he’s in the game. Looked at in such a light, Barack Obama has done pretty well. Having inherited two wars and a global economic crisis from the George W. Bush administration—the foreign policy equivalent of runners on base with no outs—Obama has extricated the country from some old problems, avoided getting trapped in some new ones, and made some solid pickups on the side.

There have been errors, wild pitches, and lost opportunities. But like George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, Obama will likely pass on to his successor an overall foreign policy agenda and national power position in better shape than when he entered office, ones that the next administration can build on to improve things further. Given how many administrations fail even that limited test, such an accomplishment is worthy of praise rather than the contempt the administration’s foreign policy often receives.

The key to Obama’s success has been his grasp of the big picture: his appreciation of the liberal international order that the United States has nurtured over the last seven decades, together with his recognition that the core of that order needed to be salvaged by pulling back from misguided adventures and feuds in the global periphery. The president is variously painted as a softheaded idealist, a cold-blooded realist, or a naive incompetent. But he is actually best understood as an ideological liberal with a conservative temperament—somebody who felt that after a period of reckless overexpansion and belligerent unilateralism, the country’s long-term foreign policy goals could best be furthered by short-term retrenchment. In this, he was almost certainly correct, and with the necessary backpedaling having been accomplished, Washington can turn its attention to figuring out how to get the liberal order moving forward once again.

An “ideological liberal with a conservative temperament.” Tout à fait. I like that.


…looking at recent history, the president concluded that the region’s various domestic problems are neither easily solvable nor his to solve. After all, as the former administration official Philip Gordon has noted, “In Iraq, the U.S. intervened and occupied, and the result was a costly disaster. In Libya, the U.S. intervened and did not occupy, and the result was a costly disaster. In Syria, the U.S. neither intervened nor occupied, and the result is a costly disaster.” And in Yemen, one might add, the United States relied on drone strikes and active diplomacy, and the result is a costly disaster. If the Middle East is bent on convulsing itself in costly disasters, as seems unfortunately true these days, trying to play a constructive role from the sidelines rather than getting embroiled directly represents not weakness but prudence.

As for the administration’s signature diplomatic achievement, the Iran nuclear deal, it exemplifies Obama’s broader approach to foreign policy. Having pledged as a candidate to be willing to talk to any country without preconditions to see if relations could be improved, once elected, Obama spent years doggedly pursuing a less conflictual relationship with Tehran. Judging that the Islamic Republic was not about to collapse, he gave a cold shoulder to the opposition Green Movement that sprang up after Iran’s disputed 2009 presidential election. When the Iranian government rebuffed his initial efforts at reconciliation, he worked with other countries to craft a tightened net of economic and financial sanctions. And when Iran decided it did want to negotiate after all, he invested substantial effort and political capital in trying to make the talks succeed. The result was a solid arms control agreement trading sanctions relief for a decadelong pause in Iran’s quest for a bomb. No war, no appeasement, a team effort with other great powers to try to come up with a practical solution to a significant but limited problem, and the creation of conditions in which progress might be made on broader issues over time­—all vintage Obama.


Listening to discussions of American national security these days, one would think the country were in truly dire straits. “The world has never been more dangerous than it is today,” according to Senator Marco Rubio. “The world is literally about to blow up,” says Senator Lindsey Graham. Even people who are not running for the Republican presidential nomination apparently agree. In 2012, General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared, “In my personal military judgment, formed over 38 years, we are living in the most dangerous time in my lifetime, right now.” In 2014, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said that the threat from ISIS “is beyond anything that we’ve seen.”

To use a technical term, this is hogwash. The United States today may be richer, stronger, and safer than it has ever been; if not, it is certainly close to it. It has a defense budget equivalent to those of the next seven countries combined and together with its allies accounts for three-quarters of all global defense spending. It has unparalleled power-projection capabilities and a globe-spanning intelligence network. It has the world’s reserve currency, the world’s largest economy, and the highest growth rate of any major developed country. It has good demographics, manageable debt, and dynamic, innovating companies that are the envy of the world. And it is at the center of an ever-expanding liberal order that has outwitted, outplayed, and outlasted every rival for three-quarters
of a century.

Seriously, between Barack Obama and Marco Rubio—or any of the other GOP candidates—il n’y a pas photo, as we say in these parts.

Read all of Gideon Rose’s article here.

Marco Rubio on the Iran deal

Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), who is running for the Republican presidential nomination, if one hadn’t heard, is considered to be a foreign policy heavyweight in the GOP, or at least more knowledgeable and thoughtful on the general subject than the other candidates of his party, perhaps Lindsey Graham excepted. Rubio is naturally opposed to the Iran deal and explained why in an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg, which was published twelve days ago on The Atlantic website. My friend Claire Berlinski, who is situated on Rubio’s side of the political spectrum, is impressed with what Rubio says to Goldberg, writing on the Ricochet blog—where she’s an editor—that Rubio “makes sense.”

Well, I beg to differ with my friend Claire, as I don’t think Rubio makes sense at all. I think he makes nonsense, and along with the rest of his GOP associates on the Iran question (not to mention on every other question)—though, I will grant, he does come across as more thoughtful, at least superficially, in proffering his nonsense. As I am not a dues-paying member of the Ricochet blog—so may therefore not post comments there—and in lieu of sending Claire a private email, I will post my critique of Rubio’s nonsense here on AWAV.

Rubio thus tells Goldberg (N.B. all block quotes are of Rubio, unless otherwise indicated)

Well, I was just reading out of the text of the agreement, and I assure you that the Iranians interpret it the way that I alluded to, which is that if they come under cyberattack or any other effort to sabotage their program, then not just the U.S., but all the world powers, will have the obligation to assist them technically in defeating those measures. Now obviously Kerry and the administration would say that their reading of this is that we’re trying to protect them from some sort of terrorist group, for example.

Rubio is no doubt referring to the JCPOA’s Annex III.D.10 on nuclear security, in the context of civil nuclear cooperation. There is no mention in this clause of any “obligation” in regard to technical assistance. The operative passage here is “co-operation in the form of training courses and workshops.” This seems uncontroversial and not something to set off alarm bells. Also, one wonders how Rubio can know in advance how the Iranians are going to interpret the clause.

There are companies and banks around the world that might be considering making significant investments in Iran, and what they need to know is that if they make a significant investment in Iran and a future administration reimposes sanctions, or Iran violates the deal, or Iran conducts some outrageous act of terrorism around the world and [is] sanctioned for it,

An “outrageous act of terrorism around the world”?  The last time Iran was accused of such a thing was in Buenos Aires in 1994 but, while the Iranian regime was surely behind that one, such has not definitively been proven and twenty-one years after the fact. No specific sanctions were imposed on Iran as a consequence. So why, pray, would a hypothetical recidivist attack in some far-flung corner of the world—for which Tehran would deny any responsibility and could not be proven—now get Iran in hot water?

your investment could be lost. If you go into Iran and build a pharmaceutical plant, and you invest all this money to build it, and then suddenly Iran does something, and now you’re subject to sanctions if you continue to do business with them, you’re going to lose that investment. And so I do think that it’s important for investors and others around the world who are looking to do more business with Iran to be very conscious about this, because they’re basically gambling that this regime is not violating the deal or doing something new that could impose sanctions.

Once the JCPOA is implemented and the UN and other sanctions are progressively lifted, companies, banks, and other investors will make investment decisions in Iran based on that, as well as on business-related criteria. And in the event of a complaint about Iran to the UNSC from one of the E3/EU+3 and that results in snapback sanctions, investments already made in Iran will not be affected, as—and the JCPOA is explicit on this—there will be no retroactivity in regard to contracts signed before a hypothetical reinstatement of UN sanctions.

As for a future US administration unilaterally reimposing sanctions, this cannot and will not affect non-US investments in Iran, as any attempt by the US to impose sanctions on third countries will provoke a firestorm in US relations with its E3/EU+3 partners, not to mention just about everyone else. Unless the US formally commits to issuing blanket waivers, it will be subjected to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism—the EU and/or other WTO members will be certain to file a complaint—and the US will lose, period, as third country sanctions are, except in exceptional circumstances, illegal in international law.

If the US ignores the certain WTO/DSM ruling and seeks to bar offending foreign companies and financial institutions from the US market anyway, the US will be an international outlaw. A rouge state. And it will still lose in the end.

Well, the likeliest way it’s going to happen is there will be some facility somewhere in Iran that we have suspicions about, and the IAEA will go to Iran and say, “We want to see this facility.” And Iran will say, “This is outrageous. We’re not showing you anything.” And they’ll go through a 24-day process back and forth, and ultimately it won’t be a massive thing, it’ll be an incremental thing, and Iran will say to the world, “Are you going to blow up this entire arrangement and allow us to go off and do whatever we want over this small technical issue?” And there will be a series of small, incremental violations like that, that ultimately over time will wear down the enforcement mechanism. And unless you absolutely catch them in a Cuban missile crisis-style situation, with pictures, red-handed, the world’s not going to force it, because there’ll be too many vested interests economically in Europe and around the world arguing against it. (…)

Well, I just think in their mind, they figure, “We can game this thing for a while. We still haven’t developed a long-range rocket anyway. You know, we didn’t necessarily intend to have a bomb in the next 48 months anyway. So, let’s go ahead and incrementally wear on this thing while we aim for modern-day centrifuge capabilities, while we rebuild our economy, while we rebuild our conventional capability.”

Rubio is engaging in what we in France call a discussion de café de commerce. In other words, he doesn’t know what he’s talking about. He’s tossing out half-baked hypotheses and idly speculating. On Iran’s eventual behavior when the JCPOA comes into effect, Rubio is quite sure the Iranians will cheat. For opponents of the Iran deal, it is a mantra that the Iranians are cheaters. This almost goes without saying; as if cheating is an Iranian cultural trait, congenital to the national character. Now it is, of course, possible that Iran will surreptitiously seek to contravene its treaty obligations, which is why the JCPOA contains inspection measures that the vast majority of arms control experts consider to be exceptionally robust. But seriously, why do Rubio and other deal opponents think Iran will cheat? Does the Islamic Republic of Iran have a history of not respecting bi- or multilateral agreements it has signed? If so, it would be helpful to have examples (I can’t think of any offhand). And why should Iran be trusted less than, say, the Soviet Union was, or any other adversary with whom the US signed arms control agreements over the decades (or agreements of any kind)? In point of fact, the default attitude here should be that the Iranians—like the E3/EU+3—will respect the JCPOA. Honestly, why shouldn’t they?

But if Marco Rubio or one of his GOP compères enters the White House in January 2017 and proceeds to denounce US commitments to the JCPOA, which country will the international community conclude cannot be trusted to respect agreements it has signed?

On the US isolating itself if it rejects or repudiates the Iran deal, Iranian-American writer Hooman Majd, in a NYT op-ed dated August 17th, “Iranians dare to hope,” concludes with this

But the deal isn’t about the United States anymore. If Iran abides by it (even as America rejects it) the rest of the world will too, and the United States will have killed not the deal but its own credibility, the tremendous goodwill it has in Iran, and even its own economic interests. And Iran, the Iranians know, will abide by the treaty, make do in a world without America, and will re-elect, in 2017, the president who brought them the promise of a better life.

Back to Rubio:

 I would argue that it is not, because you’re about to see billions of dollars of assets held abroad returned. That money can’t be pulled back. Once [the Iranians] get it they’ll be able to do what they want with it. I mean, it isn’t going to be used to build hospitals and roads.

How the hell does Marco Rubio know this?! How does he know that the billions of Iranian dollars will not be used for infrastructure and other things that will benefit the Iranian people (and increase the popularity of the regime in the process)?!

In fact, he doesn’t know at all. He’s just idly speculating. Le café de commerce.

I imagine they’ll spend some on domestic considerations, but if history is a guide, they’ll use the money to increase their reach in the region, and that means supporting [Syrian President] Assad, Hezbollah, the 14th of February movement in Bahrain, the Houthis in Yemen, you name it. There are Shia militias in Iraq they will support, and this is not to mention their long-range missile capabilities and their other asymmetrical conventional capabilities that they’ll work on.

First of all, history is no guide here. And I will wager that Marco Rubio, were he to take an exam of mine on this history (without having taken my course, at least), would not get an ‘A’. Second, precisely how will Iran “use the money” to support its clients in the region? Regarding the Assad regime in Syria and Hizbullah, they’re already being backed by Iran to the hilt. According to Israeli intelligence, Hizbullah already has over 100,000 rockets and missiles aimed at Israel, all presumably supplied by Iran. So would more money for that many more rockets and missiles increase ever more the danger to Israel? On the “14th of February movement [sic]” in Bahrain: Why shouldn’t this receive more money? It could no doubt use some. And there is no reason under the sun why anyone with an interest in democracy promotion in the region should be opposed. The Houthis in Yemen? So what about them? In point of fact, the US has no dog in the Yemeni civil war and, par ailleurs, has no reason whatever to be opposing the Houthis. If anything, the US should be tilting toward the Houthis, who are fighting Al-Qaida in Yemen and, as Zaidis, will be reliable enemies of the Islamic State should the latter set up shop in the Arabian peninsula (an eventuality that must not be excluded). Shia militias in Iraq? I’m sorry to inform you, Senator Rubio, but that horse has already bolted. Shia Iraq is entirely occupied by Shia militias and which are, let us be clear on this, an essential bulwark against the expansion of the Islamic State. Long range Iranian missiles? Ouf! GMAB.

The view in the region is that Iran is a country bent on regional domination. They believe the ayatollah’s call to be a leader of all the Muslim world, not just Shia Muslims, and they have a view that Iran has a rightful place in the world as a dominant power.

The only people outside US right-wing circles who believe this preposterous, ridiculous notion are the ruling cliques in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, who have an existential hang-up about Persians and Shi’ism. That’s their problem, not America’s.

And so Sunni Arabs see all this as a direct threat, and they view Iran as being empowered now. They are now the power in the region that has been given global-power status.

Oy vey, Iran being “given global-power status”… This one takes the cake. Now we’re in La La Land. The notion of Iran endowed with global-power status—and of this being delivered to it on a platter by the JCPOA—is utterly unserious; it is so unworthy of serious response that it will not receive it here (if one does want a response to Rubio’s ludicrous assertion, see Daniel Larison’s takedown in TAC).

As for Sunni Arabs—but which ones outside ruling Saudi/Gulfi circles precisely?—who see Iran as a threat (existential), let them deal with that. The Saudis (and Gulfis et al) will look after their interests, and the United States of America will look after hers…

and if we would just mind our own business, this theory goes [i.e. that a lot of our problems in the region were caused by us being too engaged, because we were telling people what to do]—and in particular force the Israelis to work out a deal with the Palestinians—that somehow the region would become more stable. And so you married that belief to fatigue, and that leads to this foreign policy we now see. What happened since is you’ve seen the fatigue go away as ISIS began beheading people, and you’ve seen the implications of this retreat from the region, which is that it leaves behind a vacuum, a vacuum that has led to chaos. It’s led to chaos in Iraq, it’s increasingly leading to chaos in Afghanistan. ISIS is now fighting with the Taliban to become the premier Islamist group on the ground. You’ve seen the chaos in Libya. You’ve seen the chaos spreading to other parts of North Africa as well. And so you’re seeing the results of that play itself out in chaos, but ultimately they’re forcing this president back into the region.

This is gobbledygook. Hot air. MENA is in chaos. We know that. Who doesn’t? But what specifically does this have to do with the actions, or non-actions, of the US? Except if one wants to argue—and not without reason—that the 2003 US invasion of Iraq set off a chain reaction of events in the region that led to the current situation, though one doubts this is what Rubio is getting at.

[Obama was] the guy who was going to get us out of these conflicts, but now he has been pulled back in, and he’s trying to do it in the most limited way possible.

A historical mise au point is in order here. President Obama pledged during the 2008 campaign to withdraw US forces from Iraq. But, in fact, this became a done deal in the final weeks of Bush’s presidency, when the US and Iraq signed a SOFA stipulating that all US forces in Iraq would be withdrawn by the end of 2011. Obama, during the 2011 negotiations for a renewed SOFA, strove to keep a residual US military presence but the Iraqi parliament would not agree to this, as the US was insisting that US military personnel not be liable for prosecution in Iraqi courts, and to which the democratically elected Iraqi parliament responded with a categorical ‘no’. And so that was that. The US had no choice but to quit Iraq at the end of 2011. If Marco Rubio or anyone who shares his world-view on foreign policy wishes to disagree on this, I invite him or her to explicitly state what the US president should have done in this circumstance.

And then there’s Afghanistan, which is curiously absent from present-day GOP discourse. Republicans like to extol Bush’s Iraq surge of 2007—which sent US troop numbers there from 130K to 160K—but neglect to mention Obama’s Afghan surge of 2009-10, when US troop levels more than tripled, from 32K to 100K. Not that this made a huge difference in the end but still, it did not precisely signify a wish on Obama’s part “to get us out of these conflicts.”

But this is ending up making it worse, not better, because what’s happening now in Iraq is people are looking at these limited air strikes and saying, “This is not American power. We know what American power really looks like, and this isn’t it.” This is a cosmetic show of force that ultimately shows you’re not truly committed to defeating these people, and this has undermined our credibility with Jordan, with the Saudis, with the Egyptians, with others.

Immediate question: how on earth does Marco Rubio know what “people” in Iraq are saying in regard to US air strikes? More to the point: What precisely does he think the US should be doing to defeat “these people”—presumably the Islamic State—in Iraq and Syria? And how does he propose to display “American power [as it] really looks like”? Send American troops back to Iraq? If so, how many, knowing that taking on IS will be a somewhat greater challenge than the 2003 cakewalk to Baghdad?

In a Ricochet post a couple of months ago, Claire, in taking the Obama administration to task for what she called its “non-strategy” vis-à-vis the Islamic State, expressed puzzlement at the relative silence of “our-too-calm” Republican candidates. Claire was miffed as to why the latter weren’t “screaming” over the latest outrage committed by IS. In fact, the answer is simple: If the GOP candidates are going to scream bloody murder about IS, they will necessarily have to say what they would do about it if they were to succeed President Obama. And the fact is, they have no idea. They haven’t a clue. (On the GOP’s Middle East/foreign policy cluelessness, see David Sanger’s NYT article from the other day). More air power will not do the job and sending 10,000 US troops to Iraq—as Lindsey Graham has proposed—won’t either. If the US wishes to eradicate the Islamic State—which, horrible as it is, poses no threat to the American homeland—it will take an armada larger than the one in 2003 and that will stay in Iraq and Syria for many years (and under what mandate?). The Republicans may be crazy warmongers—in their rhetoric, at least—but none of their candidates are so crazy—or at least imprudent—as to propose such a thing.

There is actually one Republican candidate who has made sensible statements of late on the Middle East, and that’s the current front-runner. As Bloomberg Politics writer Melinda Henneberger reported from the campaign trail in New Hampshire last weekend

[Donald Trump] called himself the “most militaristic person in the room,” then added, “but you have to know when to use it.” And he also says not only that we should never have gone into Iraq, but that we were better off with Saddam Hussein in charge there. “You had Iran and Iraq and they were the same; they were twins…Well, we took one out and look at the mess we have; we destabilized the Middle East. I’m not a fan of Saddam Hussein, but he ran the place, and he had no weapons of mass destruction. And now, instead of Saddam Hussein, we have far more brutal.” No, this is not an unheard-of view, but it is one that has generally been heard only from Democrats. Yet when the Republican front-runner says these things now—that we have nothing whatsoever to show for all the blood spilled there—many heads nod.

Not bad. What Donald Trump had to say in NH was certainly more level-headed than Marco Rubio’s brandishing the spectre, sans rire, of Iranian nuclear mushroom clouds over California in a speech there last month. Haven’t Republicans learned their lesson by now about conjuring up mushroom clouds to scare people?

Rubio is at least lucid about one thing, which is the likely outcome of the congressional vote on the Iran deal. Congress will certainly reject it but will not have the votes to override President Obama’s veto. There is no way 13 Democrats in the Senate plus 44 in the House will go against their president. Jamais de la vie. So the Iran deal will be a done one once and for all. And the Republicans will have to find another foreign policy issue to demagogue and talk nonsense on.



Van Jones, the founder/president of Dream Corps and Rebuild the Dream—and President Barack Obama’s green jobs adviser in 2009—has an important commentary on the CNN website on the Black Lives Matter movement and the “5 lessons” Democrats should draw from the recent disruptions of Bernie Sanders’s rallies. Now I had a negative reaction to the spectacle of the two BLM women disrupting Bernie’s Seattle event last Saturday—I hate hecklers and in almost all circumstances, as I wrote some four years ago—though Van Jones specifies that BLM is a decentralized, unstructured movement and that not all actions of those claiming its name—who may, in fact, have nothing to do with BLM—are to be defended. Regardless of what happened in Seattle, though, there are primordial issues for Black Americans—specific ills that require specific remedies—that are not being adequately addressed by liberal Democrats and their progressive economic agenda—issues that national Democrats would prefer not to dwell on, as these have to do with the police and the functioning of the criminal justice system. But, as Jones writes, “[i]n case anyone missed the memo after Ferguson, Baltimore and Charleston, here it is: the Obama era of black silence on issues that matter to us is over.” And the Dems must address these issues head on.

One issue, e.g., is the subject of an article by Mother Jones contributing writer Jack Hitt in the September-October 2015 issue, “Police shootings won’t stop unless we also stop shaking down black people,” on the dependence of many municipalities with poor populations—and thus a low local tax base—on fines in order to finance city government—and particularly police departments—thus turning the police into predatory extortion rackets.

A case in point is Ferguson MO, which criminology professors Richard Wright and Richard Rosenfeld—respectively of Georgia State U. and the U. of Missouri-St. Louis—explain in a piece (August 11th) on “Why Ferguson erupts,” on the website/blog The Conversation: Academic Rigor, Journalistic Flair. Money quote

Today, many of these [poor] municipalities [in St. Louis county] rely heavily on traffic fines and court fees to stay afloat.

This patchwork of speed traps is a bad joke among more affluent inhabitants of St Louis County.

But it is no joke for those who accumulate traffic fines they cannot afford to pay, miss court dates and are jailed on outstanding arrest warrants. As the Washington Post’s Radley Balko has documented, that is an all-too-frequent experience for the county’s disadvantaged black residents, convinced they are harassed by the police and abused by uncaring white prosecutors.

Another issue is the subject of an article by freelance journalist Nick Pinto, “The bail trap,” in the latest NYT Magazine. The lede: “Every year, thousands of innocent people [in their great majority black and brown] are sent to jail only because they can’t afford to post bail, putting them at risk of losing their jobs, custody of their children — even their lives.”

Van Jones, in his article, reminds the Democrats that their presidential candidate will need 90 to 95% of the black vote in order to win next year. But not only will blacks need to vote in this percentage range for the Democrat—which is near certain—but, more importantly, they’ll need to vote in the same proportion as whites, which they did for the first time ever in 2008, and then again in 2012. If black turnout drops next year and relative to that of whites, the Dems will have a tougher road to victory. For this reason alone, it is essential that the Democrats address the issues raised by Black Lives Matter, elaborate concrete policy responses, and pledge to act on them.

BTW, on The Conversation blog is an interesting comment (August 10th) by U. of Washington political science professors Christopher Parker and Megan Ming Francis, “Why the silence of moderate conservatives is dangerous for race relations.”

Jafar Panahi’s ‘Taxi’


Abbas Milani and Michael McFaul, both of Stanford University, have a must-read piece in The Atlantic on “What the Iran-deal debate is like in Iran.” In short, Iranian democrats—i.e. those Iranians who oppose the regime and seek a normal relationship with the West—are for the deal. None are opposed (not in Iran, at least). Obviously. Why would they be?

If one hasn’t seen it, check out the reportage from Iran by The Forward’s Larry Cohler-Esses, “A Jewish Journalist’s Exclusive Look Inside Iran.” Money quote (one among others)

During the course of my conversations with several senior ayatollahs and prominent political and government officials, it became clear that there is high-placed dissent to the official line against Israel. No one had anything warm to say about the Jewish state. But pressed as to whether it was Israel’s policies or its very existence to which they objected, several were adamant: It’s Israel’s policies. Others, notwithstanding their ideological objection to a Jewish state, made it clear they would accept a two-state solution to Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians if the Palestinians were to negotiate one and approve it in a referendum.

Ordinary Iranians with whom I spoke have no interest at all in attacking Israel; their concern is with their own sense of isolation and economic struggle. (…)

Charles Schumer & Co., take note.

If one is seeking a glimpse of Iranian society today—urban society, in Tehran—make sure to see the great Jafar Panahi’s latest film, Taxi, which won the Golden Bear at this year’s Berlinale. As one knows, Panahi was, in 2010, forbidden by a Tehran kangaroo court from making movies for twenty years and leaving Iran, though he continues to surreptitiously make movies anyway. I saw his This Is Not a Film—which I called, in my ‘Best (and worst) movies of 2011’ list, the “Saddest home movie from Iran depicting the judicial persecution of a great filmmaker”—though didn’t the more recent Closed Curtain, which, for some reason, hasn’t come to France. The latest one opened here in April and to rapturous reviews (Hollywood press reviews were likewise). Audience reaction was also stellar and with the film a box office success: 580,000 tickets sold in France, which is exceptional for a film of this kind, i.e. a film from Iran and in which not much happens. It’s just Panahi playing taxi driver, picking up passengers—from a cross-section of Tehran society—and conversing with them. It’s all staged, of course—the persons one sees are actors, professional or amateur—though with the ending, when the VAJA—or whatever branch of the security services they are—catches up with him, not being staged at all. As I asserted in my last Iran post, Iran has a vocation to be friends with the US and Europe. Not the VAJA or other regime goons but the Iranian people. How can one not think that after seeing Panahi’s movie?

Trump’s triumph


[update below] [2nd update below]

That’s what freelancer Mike Whitney, writing on an ultra-gauchiste website I do not habitually consult, called Donald Trump’s performance in the Fox News GOP presidential debate the other day—a debate that, Whitney opined, “featured the most riveting two-minute political exchange ever heard on national television.” I didn’t see the debate myself but, based on the transcript, Whitney could well be right

FOX News Brett Baier (talking to Trump): Now, 15 years ago, you called yourself a liberal on health care. You were for a single-payer system, a Canadian-style system. Why were you for that then and why aren’t you for it now?

TRUMP: As far as single payer, it works in Canada. It works incredibly well in Scotland. It could have worked in a different age, which is the age you’re talking about here.

What I’d like to see is a private system without the artificial lines around every state. I have a big company with thousands and thousands of employees. And if I’m negotiating in New York or in New Jersey or in California, I have like one bidder. Nobody can bid.

You know why?

Because the insurance companies are making a fortune because they have control of the politicians, of course, with the exception of the politicians on this stage. (uneasy laughter) But they have total control of the politicians. They’re making a fortune.

Get rid of the artificial lines and you will have…yourself great plans…

BAIER: Mr. Trump, it’s not just your past support for single-payer health care. You’ve also supported a host of other liberal policies….You’ve also donated to several Democratic candidates, Hillary Clinton included, and Nancy Pelosi. You explained away those donations saying you did that to get business-related favors. And you said recently, quote, “When you give, they do whatever the hell you want them to do.”

TRUMP: You’d better believe it.

BAIER: — they do?

TRUMP: If I ask them, if I need them, you know, most of the people on this stage I’ve given to, just so you understand, a lot of money.

TRUMP: I will tell you that our system is broken. I gave to many people, before this, before two months ago, I was a businessman. I give to everybody. When they call, I give. And do you know what? When I need something from them two years later, three years later, I call them, they are there for me. And that’s a broken system.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: What did you get from Hillary Clinton and Nancy Pelosi?

TRUMP: Well, I’ll tell you what, with Hillary Clinton, I said be at my wedding and she came to my wedding. You know why?

She didn’t have a choice because I gave. I gave to a foundation that, frankly, that foundation is supposed to do good. I didn’t know her money would be used on private jets going all over the world. It was.

BAIER: Hold on…..We’re going to — we’re going to move on.”

Mike Whitney: “There it is, two glorious minutes of pure, unalloyed truth on national television. How often does that happen?”

Now truth does get told on television but Trump did indeed make two noteworthy truthful statements—on single-payer health insurance and the outsized role of rich donors in politics—that are remarkable for a top-tier GOP presidential candidate.

Matthew Yglesias was particularly impressed by what Trump had to say on health insurance, saying that “Donald Trump had the best policy idea of anyone in [Tuesday] night’s debate.” Yglesias thus began

Donald Trump offered the single best, most original policy idea in the Republican Party debate Thursday night. He also demonstrated by far the greatest understanding of a complicated area of public policy. There, I said it.

If Trump weren’t such a bombastic, megalomaniacal, male chauvinist pig—i.e. if he weren’t Donald Trump—he could be a halfway interesting GOP candidate—and definitely more so than most of the other clowns who were on the stage with him Tuesday night.

But there’s not a snowball’s chance in hell that he’ll go the distance, at least not with the Republican party. Nate Silver gives Trump a 2% chance of winning the GOP nomination, which seems generous to me. And with Fox News now out to take Trump down and knock him out of the GOP race, his chances are lessened that much more, as both Silver and Ezra Klein confidently argue.

But Trump continues to influence the GOP debate, e.g. on immigration, as TNR senior editor Jeet Heer observes

Trump’s impact is most clearly seen in Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal, who during the earlier “undercard” debate among low-polling candidates made this startling pronouncement: “We must insist on assimilation—immigration without assimilation is an invasion…. They need to learn English, adopt our values, roll up their sleeves and get to work. I’m tired of the hyphenated Americans and the division.”

Jindal’s comments are startling because they go against the grain of most of the last century, when ethnic diversity was seen as perfectly compatible with membership in American society.

If Jindal pronounced his words en français, one could take him for Nicolas Sarkozy. Or Marine Le Pen.

On French analogies, I’ve already written that Trump is a mix of Sarkozy, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and Bernard Tapie. Three of the most loathsome, despicable persons in French political/public life.

Back to the Fox debate, Slate’s Fred Kaplan had a commentary on how shockingly ill-informed the Republican candidates were on foreign policy.

And on the general subject of Fox News, Thomas E. Mann of the Brookings Institution strongly recommends a paper (July 27th) by Jackie Calmes, a Joan Shorenstein Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and national correspondent for The New York Times, “‘They don’t give a damn about governing’: Conservative media’s influence on the Republican party.”

À suivre très certainement.

UPDATE: It looks like I may have been a bit off on who will win a Trump vs. Fox News bras de fer.

2nd UPDATE: Jacob Weisberg has a smart op-ed (August 13th) in the FT, “An alpha-male fantasy that trumps reality.” The lede: “Billionaire [Trump] is the only 69-year-old white guy in the US who lives like a rap star…” In his conclusion, Weisberg notes the rather obvious similarities of Trump and Silvio Berlusconi, with “[their] key difference [being] that Mr Trump does not take himself all that seriously as a demagogue, lacking the self-discipline and long-range calculation. He is essentially a narcissist taking his ego out for a joyride.”

Voting Rights Act + 50


[update below]

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Voting Rights Act—one of the most important pieces of legislation in American history—here is a lengthy article, ICYMI, by NYT political correspondent Jim Rutenberg, in the August 2nd NYT Magazine, on the underhanded campaign of Republicans to undermine the Act, “A dream undone: Inside the 50-year campaign to roll back the Voting Rights Act.”

It’s quite something: The US Republican party is the only major party in an advanced democracy—and, I emphasize, the only such party—that seeks to effectively disenfranchise part of its electorate; to render it more difficult for its citizens to participate in the political system and cast their ballots. Such would be inconceivable in any polity in Europe or North America, or, for that matter, in any even halfway democratic one worthy of the name outside of Europe or North America. Just saying.

ADDENDUM: On the image in the postage stamp—which was part of this series issued by the USPS—it was taken by photographer Bruce Davidson at the March 7, 1965, march in Selma, Alabama.

UPDATE: From Jenée Desmond-Harris at Vox, here are “13 things you need to know about the fight over voting rights.”

Kuwait, August 2nd 1990

Kuwait_August 2 1990

I am reminded via social media that today is the 25th anniversary of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a day that changed the destiny of the Middle East. Several persons with whom I am friends or connected on social media have recounted where they were when they heard the news that day of Saddam Hussein’s fateful move. Voilà mine: I was in Paris chez my parents—in transit, having arrived from Algiers the previous month—, in the chambre de bonne of their apartment in the 5ème. I woke up at 7 AM to the BBC World Service news (on my short wave radio), with the headline story of the Iraqi army entering Kuwait City. My immediate reaction (approximate quote): “Oh fuck, the son of a bitch [i.e. Saddam Hussein] did it!” I had been following the news over the previous days of Saddam’s sabre-rattling toward Kuwait in regard to its alleged slant drilling along the Iraqi border, and of speculation that Iraq could possibly send troops across that border—though no one expected they would go all the way to Kuwait City. My thoughts upon assimilating the news were that Saddam would never withdraw from Kuwait and only a US intervention could throw him out of there. And I stormed around my parents’ living room that morning demanding that the US send the armada to expel Saddam from Kuwait (my mother was a witness, so may attest to this). This was the first time since the Second World War that a state had invaded a neighboring state unprovoked, with which it had diplomatic relations, and was at peace. And then outright annexed it. Saddam’s action was unprecedented in the postwar era; it was an act of extreme gravity and simply could not be allowed to stand. Inaction on the part of the “international community” was inconceivable. So I was pleased when President Bush announced that the US would indeed not let Saddam’s action stand, that 200K American troops would be sent to Saudi Arabia illico, and with the UNSC adopting a unanimous resolution and President Mitterrand unreservedly on board. In short, I supported the Bush 41 administration’s policy 100% during the entire crisis, and then war, and never wavered. Et je ne regrette rien.

N.B. There were no good arguments against the action of the US-led international coalition. I had more contradictory exchanges—many heated— than I can remember over the subsequent months with opponents of the US-led intervention, in Paris, Aix-en-Provence, Algiers (especially!), Chicago, New York, Washington, and Philadelphia. Not a single contrary argument held water (“No blood for oil!”: what an inane, stupid ass slogan). And none were vindicated after the fact.

As for subsequent US policy toward Iraq—through the ’90s and, above all, in the following decade—that’s another matter altogether.


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