The Iraq War file

Here is the file of emails on I wrote on Iraq in 2002-03, that I was going to publish in the preceding post. As I didn’t have a blog at the time I wrote blog post-type letters (usually collective) to friends, family, and associates on Iraq. In 2005 I put a selection of them together in a Word file (ten pages), so I could look at them in the future and see if my analyses stood the test of time. Though I was wrong about a few things—who wasn’t?—I was right about a lot more. On the whole, my views have stood up pretty well if I may say so. I don’t expect too many people—or maybe anyone—to read through them—the file is long and there’s some repetition—but I’m using the tenth anniversary of the war to publish them, for posterity and the public record.

From: Arun Kapil
Sent: 10 August 2002 18:11

Re Iraq, the Vietnam analogy is not accurate (or won’t be, should the US intervene there). An eventual US military operation in Iraq will be relatively short in duration (i.e., nothing like the eight year engagement in Vietnam) and so won’t divide American society in the same way. I don’t think a war in Iraq would be undertaken for domestic political reasons, as a way for Bush and the Republicans to win re-election. This is not what’s going on. There are ideologically driven power centers in the Administration which want to intervene because they sincerely believe Saddam Hussein poses a mortal danger to the US and its interests. They have other geostrategic and economic reasons as well. I personally think “regime change” in Iraq is an excellent idea; every reasonable person (in Europe, the Middle East, etc, not to mention in Iraq itself) would dearly love to see Saddam and his wretched sons terminated with extreme prejudice. I could go along with the idea of intervening militarily to bring this about, provided that the intervention be short in duration, enjoy the support of America’s allies and friends in Europe and the Middle East (and preferably backed by UN resolutions), not cause suffering to the long suffering Iraqi civilian population, not destabilize the region, and be undertaken with some idea as to what will happen in Iraq afterward (i.e., that the contours of a post-Saddam regime will be more or less known in advance, that this regime will be an improvement over the preceding one, will maintain the unity of the country, and enjoy a measure of legitimacy on the part of the Iraqi population). But none of this presently obtains nor is it likely to in the event of an actual intervention. I am therefore opposed to a US intervention in Iraq, as – in the present circumstances – the probability is high that such an intervention will go seriously wrong and have potentially disastrous consequences. In other words, it could be a fiasco. I have also been insisting for months now that the US will end up not invading Iraq. Despite all the bluster and swagger coming out of Washington right now, I don’t believe for a minute that there will be a US military intervention. It’s not going to happen. I’ll try to write more about this tomorrow.

From: Arun Kapil
Sent: 09 September 2002 10:33

The debate — or what is passing for a debate — over a US invasion of Iraq is becoming increasingly surreal. Even if Bush were able to pull this off — and I still don’t believe it will happen — and without catastrophically destabilizing the region (a huge risk) and undermining the “war on terrorism” elsewhere, few in the US political and media elite have seriously meditated on what would follow in Iraq afterward. E.g., on the specter of the US occupying — uninvited and with no local equivalent of the Northern Alliance or any credible force to step in and assume power — a major Arab capital of 4 million+ inhabitants and single-handedly trying to reshape the destiny of one of the most important and intensely nationalistic of Arab states. There is no historical precedent for this. The contention of the warriors in Washington (in the Pentagon, V-P’s office and NSC, the Weekly Standard and various op-ed columnists, etc) that Iraq could somehow be transformed into a federal, pro-American democracy — or, at the very least, into a quiescent American client state — is too ludicrous to even discuss seriously. (The image of 30-something USAID “democracy experts” setting up shop in Baghdad and dishing out advice to a post-Saddam regime is worthy of Saturday Night Live). Much is made in warrior circles of the sophisticated, educated Iraqi middle class. But this middle class has been decimated and impoverished by years of Saddam’s tyranny plus the sanctions regime. The educated Iraqi middle class is also nationalistic, shares, malgré tout, much of the world-view of its Ba’athist oppressors, and has practically no relationship with Americans. The US has had no embassy in Baghdad for 29 of the past 35 years, which means, among other things, that hardly anyone in Washington has meaningful links to this middle class, or to anyone else in Iraq for that matter (outside of Kurdistan; and the Kurds, burned twice by the US over the past three decades, know better than to blindly throw in their lot with Washington). Even when there was a US presence in Baghdad (in the mid-late 80s), the reign of terror was so intense — and the regime so sinister and opaque — that it was impossible for Americans or other foreigners to forge relationships with Iraqis, either in the middle class or in ruling circles. This was and is the case for American academics as well, who, except for archaeologists, have long been unable to do field work in the country. American social scientific knowledge of contemporary Iraq is thus extremely low, less so than for any other Arab country with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia. And, as is well known, the CIA has no first-hand knowledge of Iraq at this point, nor any assets on the ground there.

But we are knowledgeable enough about Iraq to know that it is a mean, violent place (Iraqis are stereotypically viewed across the Arab world as being hotheaded and prone to violence), where tribalism is rife, and where there has never been great love for the United States. Iraqis would not resist overwhelming American force (at least not initially) but they probably wouldn’t welcome it with open arms either. A sudden power vacuum there would almost certainly unleash an orgy of revenge killings and settling-of-scores among Iraqis, such as happened during the Intifada in March 1991. Iraqis would use a US presence to engage in their own little bloodbath. Such a thing is sure to happen anyway once Saddam leaves the scene (with or without the Americans) but better that it be without tens of thousands of American soldiers caught in the middle (and eventually choosing sides, as in, e.g., Lebanon and Somalia, and with the inevitable consequences). And then the Americans would have to actually find and take out Saddam, a task roughly on the same order as hunting down General Aideed (anyone in Washington remember him?), not to mention Usama BL (remember how long it took to smoke out General Noriega — and in a neo-colony in America’s backyard to boot?). A protracted manhunt for Saddam and the neutralizing of his praetorian guard would inevitably involve significant “collateral damage” among the already long-suffering civilian population (at least some of whom presently attribute their catastrophic economic condition to the US-inspired sanctions regime). This would not endear Americans to ordinary Iraqis or encourage collaboration. Nor would it engender passivity.

A sudden power vacuum would also induce warlordism and other centrifugal forces, and open the way for regional actors to invest the country in force. Iraq would swarm with Iranian, Saudi, Syrian, and — yes — Al-Qaida agents, to name just a few, all with their own agendas and not necessarily compatible with that of the United States. And some of them, along with local allies, would not hesitate to shoot at American soldiers. The US, in short, would find itself in a calamitous situation, a hundred times worse than Beirut or Mogadishu. It would not be a clean, quick, surgical operation from which the US could then declare victory and go home. The Americans would be in over their heads and with no exit strategy. It would be a fiasco. This is what the Europeans are dreading — though so far only Gerhard Schroeder has had the political courage to forcefully express it (perhaps partly for his own electoralist reasons: let’s hope it works for him). And this even if the rest of the region remains relatively stable, which is not likely. I’ll write about this aspect later.

From: Arun Kapil
Sent: 09 October 2002 11:54

Here is my latest postion on Iraq, which I wrote earlier this week to a Washington friend and associate.

I read William Galston’s article in the Sep 23 American Prospect and pretty much agree with it, esp with his arguments regarding preemption and acting in accordance with international law. I am unalterably opposed to the US acting unilaterally and in making regime change an explicitly stated goal (as opposed to an implicit one; everyone wants an end to Saddam and his regime, after all; but such an eventuality should be a fortuitous by-product of any eventual intervention, which should be targeted at his WMDs). And I am vehemently opposed to the prospect of the Americans occupying Baghdad, installing a client regime, and trying to shape the destiny of that country. This is a recipe for fiasco and with no exit strategy, as the US would sooner or later – and probably sooner – be pulled into internecine fighting among the Iraqis. Important groups in Iraq are certain to reject the legitimacy of any US-installed regime – and which will not be able to exercise its writ -, will oppose it with violence, and will aim their fire at US soldiers. And US soldiers will fire back. And it will be Beirut and Mogadishu – and Vietnam – all over again. I find downright surreal the specter of a prolonged US occupation of that country and its cities. Apart from being a hotbed of Arab nationalism – and where more than a few blame the US for the sanctions-generated economic disaster of the past decade – Iraq and its society are practically unknown in Washington. During the past 35 years the US has had a full-fledged diplomatic presence in Baghdad for only six, and during those years normal contact with Iraqis was all but impossible. Washington’s ‘relais’ in the Iraqi middle class is practically non-existent. The notion (T.Friedman, F.Ajami, etc) that Iraqis will greet the Americans as liberators is laughable. Ils sont vraiment des innocents ces Amérloques, les grands enfants… I am quite sure many Iraqis are waiting for the US to intervene and will welcome this when it comes. But they would also welcome Denmark or Ecuador if those countries could help them get rid of Saddam and his henchmen. But Iraqis who welcome the Americans will not want them to hang around after Saddam is eliminated (except for those who become American clients and will thus need protection from rival Iraqis).

I support the current French UNSC position for two resolutions: a first, strengthened one for inspections and, if necessary, a second one later on authorizing force if the Iraqis cooperate in bad faith and thwart UNMOVIC’s work. If the US insists on its present resolution, the Frogs should cast a veto. I am not a priori opposed to force if the UNSC does authorize it down the road. But it should be carried out in such a way as to provoke a coup or uprising against Saddam. The US should play no more than a supporting role in this, as an ultimate guarantee to those fighting Saddam that they will not be abandoned. But the Iraqis must oust Saddam themselves and be left to sort out the aftermath.

Among the not-good arguments for opposing an invasion:

— It will lead to the breakup of Iraq. This will not happen. The Kurds (assuming the KDP and PUK can make common cause) won’t dare proclaim an independent state – which they insist they don’t seek -, as this will result in certain Turkish intervention. And there is no secessionist sentiment among the Shia, who will in any case not want to become vassals of Iran. Shia elites want Baghdad and nothing less.

— It will lead to popular uprisings across the Arab world and the overthrow of “moderate” regimes. This also will not happen. King Abdallah might find himself in a tight spot if the shit hits the fan but he’ll survive (after all, what is the available alternative there?). No other regime will be threatened in the least. But if there is a prolonged US occupation of Iraq, UBL’s boys will have many new recruits in Cairo, Jidda, Alger, etc. The US in Iraq will become the new Soviets in Afghanistan. It will become dicey, if not downright dangerous, for Americans to work – or even move about – in much of the Arab world. Islamists will be strengthened across the board, including in Iraq itself, and which will not be a good thing.

— Saddam will lob Scuds at Israel, who will then retaliate, leading to a regional conflagration. This is most unlikely. One of the first objectives of a US intervention will be to neutralize any ability of the Iraqis to fire anything at Israel. And if this does happen, Bush will order Sharon not to riposte. Period.

From: Arun Kapil
Sent: 01 February 2003 18:59

(…)  I am not opposed to the administration’s goals – of ridding Iraq of WMD and ridding the Iraqis of Saddam – but have big problems with the way they want to go about achieving them. I could be for an invasion if there were a reasonable certainty that it would be short, swift, cause minimal civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, and be multilateral (with support from France, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey). And if it did not involve taking Baghdad or occupying the country for any length of time. But I seriously doubt it will happen this way. The specter of US troops storming an Arab capital of five million inhabitants is something I find surreal. There is no precedent for this. I am quite sure you’re right about the Republican Guard and other praetorian units fighting to the bitter end. They’ve surely been training for this for a long time now and in ways the US doesn’t know. Scenes of street battles and civilian casualties on CNN, Al-Jazeera, etc, will be disastrous for the US. It is indeed possible many Iraqis will welcome the Americans and use their presence to settle scores. But once Saddam and his henchmen are neutralized – which will happen in a matter of weeks after the ground assault is launched (if that) – those same Iraqis who welcomed the Americans will have no more use for them and will not want them to stick around. And American soldiers will start getting shot at. Alternatively, Iraq will descend into civil strife, the US will inevitably end up siding with one group against the other, and that other group will then shoot at Americans (and who will be aided by the many Iranian, Syrian, Al-Qaida et al agents who will stream into the country after Saddam is eliminated). The Beirut and Mogadishu parallels are relevant in either case, except that Baghdad will be far worse, and with repercussions across the region and in the ‘war against terrorism’. I am amazed that these previous debacles are hardly evoked in what passes for the debate in Washington (just as I find laughably naive all the happy talk about installing democracy in Iraq and elsewhere in the region; not that this isn’t desirable but is simply not something the US has the ability to bring about). I would put the probability of an occupation of Iraq ending in fiasco on the order of 98%, which is why I ultimately have to be against an invasion (not to mention the terrible consequences this will inevitably have for the Iraqi population).

But I would dearly love to see Saddam and his charming sons terminated with extreme prejudice and am therefore conflicted on the issue. Your argument about Saddam being deterrable is valid. He has indeed refrained from crossing explicitly drawn red lines. But he still cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon or a delivery system. That Saddam could possess the mere ability to destroy the Kuwaiti and Saudi oil fields is a risk that cannot be taken. And if it became evident that Iraq were on the verge of acquiring nuclear capability, the Israelis would almost certainly launch their own preemptive strike, and with all the consequences that would have. If Saddam can be effectively prevented from building a nuclear bomb, however, then deterrence is probably the best option (let him keep his CBWs, which are not, strictly speaking, WMDs anyway). In this respect, I think Kenneth Pollack’s arguments against deterrence are not convincing. E.g., I don’t see why the UN – as part of a movement to deterrence and the lifting of sanctions – couldn’t impose a Kosovo-style protectorate over Kurdistan until the regime in Baghdad changes. And why the US couldn’t maintain a significant military presence in the smaller Gulf states to respond rapidly to any of Saddam’s shenanigans.

[The email below was a response to a Fox News watching, Rush Limbaugh listening, France bashing, America Firster husband of a friend, who, in one of his unsolicited email commentaries on the war, rhetorically asked me what I thought of the dozen or so Iraqis who cheered on the Americans as they crossed the border from Kuwait, and assuring me that there would be a lot more of this to come. In an email several days later he celebrated the heroic exploits of Jessica Lynch in Nasiriya (as if bravery and valor were qualities Americans possessed in greater quantities than did other peoples). As it turned out, the initial media vaunted story of Jessica Lynch was pure invention. Never got a follow-up from my interlocutor on that.]

—– Original Message —–

From: Arun Kapil
To: Bruce
Sent: 21 March 2003 22:02

> But who thinks this won’t happen? We all know that if the Iraqi population
> is largely spared by the bombing many will greet the Americans as
> liberators. They would do so with any formidable foreign army that came to
> overthrow Saddam’s tyranny. But if the US tries to occupy Iraq and run it
> as a protectorate those same Iraqis will turn against the Americans. They
> will not accept a foreign occupation of their country and they will resist
> it. And that’s when the big problems will begin for the Americans.
> And like the French and others, those Iraqis will not express “gratitude”
> toward their “liberators”.  Iraq will be heartbreak city for the Americans.

[N.B. Bruce’s response to this was that I was crazy.]

[The email below was a response to a Washington-based Iraq hand working in the oil sector.]

From: Arun Kapil
To: Raad
Sent: 24 March 2003 15:29
Subject: Re: Iraq report

Dear Raad,

Thanks for your mail and the Iraq report. Sorry I didn’t get back to you earlier about it. I pretty much see the post-Saddam situation the way you do, though think that you perhaps understate the difficulties the US will face if/when it tries to settle in for a lengthy occupation. I have been arguing from the outset – over a year now – that an eventual US occupation of Iraq would be folly and almost certain to end in fiasco. You mention that US policy-makers “appear to have little real understanding of Iraqi politics and society”. Yes indeed. Talk of what will happen the “day after” invariably ignores the fact that Iraq is the least known Arab country to policy-makers in Washington – and in the broader policy and academic communities more generally (e.g., think of the number of books or doctoral dissertations on Iraq by American social scientists over the past thirty years that involved extensive field work in the country; I can count them on one hand). Kenneth Pollack acknowledged this ignorance in his book but he is one of the few to have done so (and he seems not to have first-hand knowledge of Iraq himself or to know Arabic). Over the past 35 years the US has had a full-fledged embassy in Baghdad for exactly six, and during those years (1984-90) it was all but impossible, given the climate of terror, for Americans there to forge ties with members of Iraq’s much vaunted middle class, not to mention personnel of the regime. We know this well. Comparatively speaking, Washington has good knowledge of Algeria and extensive relationships with Algerian elites but I have been in a position to evaluate the real quality of this – and during the period when there was no security problem there and the system was as politically liberal as it has ever been (1989-91). It’s not impressive, believe me.

So the US intends to occupy and administer a major Arab country that it simply does not know and with whose elites it has practically no relationship. I find this prospect absolutely surreal. You’re right to say that Iraqis will likely celebrate the end of Saddam’s regime and the situation they have endured for the past twelve years (the ICG report last December – whose author I greatly respect on the matter – predicted as much). Unless Baghdad becomes a ‘Stalingrad’ in the coming weeks – probably not, though in view of the apparently fierce resistance in Nasiriya and elsewhere in the south, who knows? – I have little doubt that many there will welcome the Americans as liberators – as they would welcome any formidable army that came to overthrow Saddam’s tyranny. But as you say, those same Iraqis will not necessarily welcome a US occupation and for a variety of reasons.

It goes without saying that the Americans’ planned Interim Civil Administration would have to work through the existing apparatus of the Iraqi state and its functionaries, minus a few Baathists. US officials seconded from federal departments and agencies to run Iraqi ministries – who will likely have no knowledge of Iraq or of Arabic – will obviously need the active cooperation of the Iraqi civil service. When the ICA issues decrees, it will depend on the apparatus of the Iraqi state to execute them. For this to happen, the Iraqi civil service in its ensemble and in all corners of the country will have to accept the legitimacy of the Americans telling them what to do. I have grave doubts that this will happen. The war party in Washington has insisted that Iraq is not like Afghanistan, in view of the sizable, educated Iraqi middle class and existence of state institutions there. But the very existence of this middle class – which is nationalist by definition – almost insures that it will not take kindly to entering into a subordinate, colonial-like relationship with the Americans, not to mention accepting the humiliation of the inevitable identity checks they and the rest of the Iraqi population will be subjected to – at roadblocks, border crossings, airports – by American soldiers. (one can imagine the impact media images of this will have in Iraq and across the Arab world, and the obvious parallel that will be made with Israelis and Palestinians).

On the level of security, the US will likewise need the active cooperation of Iraqis. Even if the Americans were to permanently station several hundred thousand troops in Iraq – hardly a realistic prospect – they will not be able to police the country on their own, let alone control its borders. I completely exclude this possibility. The Americans will need Iraqi ‘harkis’ to help them with the job, i.e., the existing police apparatus at a minimum and likely the regular army as well (purged of Baathists). But will these agree to take orders from Americans, to be America’s harkis? Again, I have grave doubts.

American occupation authorities will have two alternatives if they do not receive the full cooperation of Iraqi state agents. One will be to rule in the old fashioned colonial way: through coercion. The occupation will then inevitably take on a repressive character, which the US insists it has no intention of. This would, needless to say, provoke resistance, inevitably resulting in the formation of the “Jabha al-Jihadiyya lil-Tahrir al-Iraq” (my invention) and other groups of the sort. The other alternative for the US will be to co-opt and favor selected individuals and groups within the state and Iraqi society. Occupation forces invariably find locals willing to collaborate so this won’t be too difficult. But it will also inevitably sow discord among Iraqis and turn the enemies of the collaborators into enemies of the American occupiers, and which will also result in the creation of the Jabha al-Jihadiyya and other such groups – and who will in turn be aided, directly and indirectly, by interested foreign parties who will be sure to flood Iraq with their agents (you mentioned Iran and the Turks – the latter of whom will take matters into their own hands to insure their interests in the north and Kirkuk – but these will also include, among others, Syria – which has extensive ties with and knowledge of Iraq -, Saudis, Russians – why not? – and, lest one forget, Al-Qaida and other motley Islamists). The US will then be faced with quelling an insurgency (or insurgencies) and it will be Beirut and Mogadishu all over again, and with the consequent impact on US public opinion. Armed bands resisting the US will not only aim their fire at US military assets but also – and probably mainly so – at soft targets, i.e., at the many US civilians slated to administer and reconstruct the country, as well as Iraqis who collaborate with them. Such a campaign of asymmetric warfare – even at a low level – will make it difficult to impossible for Americans to work in Iraq (and few if any will be willing to go there under such circumstances). Death threats against pro-US Iraqis and their families – some of which will surely be carried out – will also dampen enthusiasm for collaboration (as those pro-US Iraqis will know that their American patrons will sooner or later pack their bags and go home). Unless Iraq is totally pacified and absolute security is assured – which is most unlikely – American reconstruction projects will not even get off the ground (and which I don’t believe for a minute that Congress will fund over the long term in any case). This will render the American occupation untenable.

Then there will be the matter of legal status of the ICA. Chirac has already promised that the UN will not accord its imprimatur to a unilateral US occupation of Iraq. And recent experience has taught that the French are not bluffing, as it has taught that the majority of the UNSC will not easily be won over to the American position. The ICA’s acts will thus have no standing in international law. I am not a jurist but it stands to reason that all contracts concluded between the ICA and foreign enterprises – including oil companies – will rest on shaky legal ground and risk being declared null and void by a future Iraqi government, democratically elected or not. Without UN sanction, NGOs will be reluctant to set up operations in Iraq. Iraqi diplomats answering to the ICA will have problems of accreditation abroad. The US itself will clearly have no legal authority to speak for Iraq in international forums. And then there will be the attitude of regional and international public opinion…

Again, this situation will be untenable for the Americans. And it will be even more so for Tony Blair. The pressures on Blair will be such that he will likely be forced to modify his engagement with the Americans in Iraq, if not pull out altogether. Such an eventuality will be a diplomatic debacle of the first order for Bush. All in all, I simply do not see how the Americans will be able to pull off their post-Saddam schemes. The only way out will be for Bush to go back to the UNSC, hat in hand, and agree to a UN-led Kosovo style administration for Iraq, in which the French, Russians, and Arab states will play a role, and with the US presence diminished. Whether or not Bush will be able to withstand such a humiliating retreat – and concede such a humiliating victory to the French – is a matter I won’t speculate on.

So these are my reactions to your report which, again, I almost entirely agree with (as it turns out, I had read your articles in MERIP and Le Monde Diplomatique of the past four years, which I thought were quite good). Generally speaking, my knowledge and understanding of the Arab world, of modern history and of modern nationalism does not intellectually enable me to contemplate an American military and civil occupation of a major Arab capital and leading Arab nation-state. Not in 2003, not with the present situation in Israel-Palestine, and not under the first US administration in history that openly and ideologically identifies with the Israeli nationalist right wing. Perhaps I will be proven wrong in what I have just written but I doubt it.

[The email below was a response to a Washington-based director of an international think tank.]

From: Arun Kapil
To: Rob
Sent: 19 April 2003 14:53
Subject: Iraq report

Dear Rob,

I had a chance to read the ICG report of March 25, as well as your and Loulouwa’s op-ed in Le Monde last week. We do agree pretty much across the board. It is essential that the UN play a central role during the political transition — and with the interim civil authority preferably headed by an Arab with unimpeachable credentials (an Algerian, e.g. Lakhdar Brahimi, may be the right man for the situation). Despite the Administration’s current position I continue to believe that it will ultimately be forced to revise its plans for a Pentagon-directed authority and to engage the UNSC. As I argued in my last mail I have serious doubts that Jay Garner & Co will be able to impose their writ in Iraq. By the time they set up shop in Baghdad they will have to contend with a multiplicity of new actors – political, civic, and less than civic – and of growing hostility to the US and its clients, local and imported (INC, etc). We’re already seeing this with the Shias; and the situation in Mosul doesn’t look too promising for an eventual Pentagon administrator who will be appointed to run the show there. By passively looking on while Iraq’s cities were pillaged and its state institutions and historical patrimony destroyed, the Americans – at least in my book – have lost all legitimacy to unilaterally shape the political and economic future of that country and exclude the UN from a central role in the transition.

I am pretty sure the Americans will be disappointed by the ultimate political outcome in Iraq, whatever it turns out to be. No matter what the regime in Baghdad – even one headed by a democratically-elected Ahmed Chalabi (which is not too likely) – it will necessarily take its distance from the US and refuse to be the latter’s client — and not only because Iraqi public opinion will demand it. Iraq cannot and will not find itself in a position of long term economic and/or security dependence on the US, as have Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc. As a potentially rich country with a sizable, educated middle class and one of the larger population bases in the region, the regime in Baghdad – whatever its nature and once Iraq’s foreign debt problem has been dealt with – will rebuild the army and diversify Iraq’s economic partnerships and sources of arms procurement. In this regard Iraq will be what Algeria was during the Boumediene period. Or what Iraq has been the past three decades. It will jealously defend its independence and not be in any foreign power’s pocket — and all the more so as it will be actively courted by just about every country which has something to offer it. Among other things, this means that the US will likely not be able to transfer its military bases from Saudi Arabia to Iraq or establish a military presence there.

The ICG report, in discussing the Iraqi opposition’s proposal to allot power and resources according to ethno-confessional criteria, observes that this Lebanon-inspired scheme assumes ‘that each group represents a cohesive and distinct unit’. The Lebanese confessional system does not in fact assume this (not the cohesiveness in any case). Confessional groups in Lebanon have always been riven by internal political divisions; what the post-1943 electoral system there did was to structure these rivalries so that factions within confessional groups would compete with each other in allying with factions from other confessional groups (so that, e.g., Maronites competing with each other would be obliged to ally with Sunni, Druze, etc, factions also competing among themselves — and that these alliances would be sufficiently serious so that the mixed confessional candidate lists could attract a maximum number of voters at election time. There were periods of the Lebanese civil war (1978-81, 1989-90) when most, if not all, of the fighting was intra-confessional. There are obviously serious problems with a Lebanese-style system, in addition to those mentioned in the ICG report: among other things, it is based on clientelism, hinders the emergence of a modern party system, and is nearly impossible to reform. This system, or some variant of it, would be a disaster for Iraq and recipe for civil war (the Sunnis would not forever accept an arrangement, formal or informal, that barred one of their own from ever attaining supreme executive power). It would be equally nefarious if a federal system were to create a majority Sunni unit in the center and Shia one in the south. A federal solution for Iraq should involve only two units: an autonomous Kurdish entity and then the rest of the country. Eventual quotas should involve Kurds but absolutely not Sunnis and Shias.

If I have other ideas on the subject – and remarks on future ICG reports – I’ll communicate them to you (this gives me the chance to put them down on paper).

Best regards

Arun

From: Arun Kapil
Sent: 08 September 2003

Re the Bush administration’s reasons for invading Iraq, I agree that it is important to differentiate between the neo-con intellectuals (Wolfowitz, Perle, et al) – and even among them – and more traditional nationalists like Rumsfeld and Cheney. But I do not accept the view that Israel was the overriding motivation for the neo-cons, or that commercial considerations played a significant role in the thinking of any sector of the administration. The neo-cons, for their part, have been obsessed with Saddam for a long time now – Wolfowitz first sounded the alarm on him in 1979 – and have made the ouster of his regime top priority since the 1991 Gulf War. The neo-con intellectual apparatus has a long paper trail on this issue – being intellectuals they do like to write and expose their ideas in the public square – so there is really no mystery as to the reasons for their fixation on Saddam. These may be understood along at least five dimensions:

1. Though they are indeed Likudniks and entirely identify with Israel, the neo-cons’ supreme concern is the national interest and security of *the United States*. Israel is of course primordial – the security of Israel being one of the US’s two major interests in the region (the other access to oil) – but in a rank-ordering of neo-con concerns, America is top banana. The neo-con movement, it should be recalled, emerged in the 1970s in reaction to what was perceived as the pacifist, neo-isolationist drift of the Democratic party – epitomized by McGovern in ’72 – and the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente with the Soviet Union. Remember: Perle & Co spent the 70s and 80s waging intellectual and political war against the Soviet Union and its “proxies”, and have been taking a hard line against China since Tienanmen. In respect to Saddam, the neo-cons perceived his aggressive behavior – and especially from 1990 onward – as posing a grave threat to US interests in the region and to the latter’s stability.

2. The neo-cons, like just about everyone else in Washington (but also elsewhere, and even in Paris), honestly did believe Saddam possessed chemical and biological weapons, was hell-bent on developing nuclear weapons, would sooner or later acquire the latter (if he indeed didn’t already have them), and was sufficiently reckless in his behavior that he would not hesitate to use this panoply in the aggressive pursuit of his ambitions. The neo-cons and others may well have been wrong about this – and perhaps they have now changed their minds – but one cannot dispute the fact that they really, really did believe their rhetoric on the issue.

3. The neo-cons fervently believed – and apparently still do – that Saddam was behind almost all the anti-US terrorism of the past decade – from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing onward and including 9/11 – and had allied with Usama Bin Ladin in this enterprise (and with Al Qaida playing a supporting – not leading – role). Laurie Mylroie’s book, published in 2000 by the American Enterprise Institute, spells out this argument in detail. And the book was vigorously endorsed by Wolfowitz, Perle, and other neo-cons (though it was dismissed by the State Dept, CIA, most of the Pentagon, etc, who regard Mylroie as a crank).

4. Most neo-cons – and especially Wolfowitz and the folks at the Weekly Standard – are Wilsonians, i.e., they fervently believe that America has a mission to spread democracy and liberal values across the world, and that US foreign policy should further this end. In regard to Saddam, the neo-cons have – at least since the Gulf War – read and heard in great detail all the accounts of the sickening, bloodthirsty, near-genocidal nature of his regime – accounts that many on the left seemed not to want to know too much about – and which fortified their conviction that Saddam and his miserable sons should be terminated at the earliest possible opportunity. When the neo-cons spoke of liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam’s tyranny, it may just be possible they were being sincere. Just as it was indeed possible that the neo-cons – led by Wolfowitz – sincerely wished to rescue the Muslims of Bosnia from rampaging Serbs in advocating US intervention from the outset in that conflict, while Bush Sr did nothing and Clinton dithered.

5. With 9/11 and the campaign of suicide bombings in Israel-Palestine, the persistence of authoritarian regimes, cultural and economic stagnation, the cancerous growth of obscurantist Islamist extremism, and the flourishing of anti-Semitic rhetoric and conspiracy theories, the neo-cons decided that the Arab world was profoundly ill, was going from bad to worse, that this condition now posed a mortal threat to America – and indeed Western civilization – and which therefore called for an externally administered electroshock, in the form of a US invasion of Iraq, the liquidation of Saddam and his Baathist regime, and an American-sponsored implementation of democracy led by the professed liberal democrat and faithful US friend Ahmed Chalabi. And all this, Fouad Ajami and Bernard Lewis promised to boot, would have a positive demonstration effect across the region, unleashing a heretofore repressed democratic, modernist dynamic in pan-Arab civil society. After 9/11 the time to act was now. As has been observed by others, many neo-cons – the older generation at least – are ex-Trotskyists, with all that this implies.

I am not suggesting that all neo-cons attach equal weight to each of these dimensions. E.g., I think Wolfowitz takes democratization of the Arab world more seriously than Perle and Feith. There is real disagreement on this issue, with some in the neo-con camp (e.g., Martin Kramer, Daniel Pipes) asserting that the Arabs are allergic to liberal, democratic values and that it is folly for the US to think it can impose these in that part of the world. And, à la Rumsfeld and Cheney (and certainly Bush), some neo-cons may have advocated the invasion so the US could throw its weight around and show the towelheads, cheese-eating monkeys and the rest who’s no. 1. (In Rumsfeld’s case I am convinced, based on no evidence whatever, that he wanted to invade Iraq in part to test his conception of a slimmed-down, rapid reaction, high-tech military and to score points with the military brass and congressional detractors in the internal debate over this issue).

As for the commercial argument, this does not withstand scrutiny. America’s commercial dealings with the Middle East – actual and potential, and apart from oil – are too insignificant to warrant the expense of even a minor military operation, let alone a full-scale war and occupation (and certainly not the $87 billion Bush will now be hitting up the American taxpayers for, and just for one year).