The Istanbul protests – VI

Gezi Park, Istanbul, June 3 2013 (Photo: Stoyan Nenov/Reuters)

Halil Karaveli, an analyst at the Washington and Stockholm-based Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, has a must read piece in Foreign Affairs, in which he says that “Erdoğan is in trouble” and that his big challenge comes from Abdullah Gül—and the Gülen movement—, not from liberals. As Foreign Affairs tends to restrict access to their online articles after a few days, here’s the whole thing

In some circles, it is almost a matter of faith that the ongoing protests in Turkey will not have any serious political consequences for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. As CFR Fellow Steven Cook wrote on ForeignAffairs.com this week, “Even today, as the tear gas continues to fly, there is no question that Erdogan would win an election.” The assumption is that the prime minster can still rely on at least the passive support of the 50 percent of the population that cast their votes for his Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the last election, held in 2011. Even if they are not entirely happy with his behavior, the thinking goes, they are not ready to withdraw their backing — good news for Erdogan, who would like to crown himself president next year. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that Erdogan’s supporters are with him for the long haul. In the end, the Taksim Square protests — and the prime minister’s response to them — have likely marked the end of an era.

As many have pointed out, the protesters in Istanbul and other Turkish cities mainly hail from the secular and liberal urban middle class. Yet they are far from alone in their weariness of Erdogan’s growing authoritarianism. Religious conservatives, the AKP’s main voter base, are uneasy with it, too. Notably, the most powerful religious community in Turkey, the fraternity of the Muslim preacher Fethullah Gulen, is now openly opposed to the prime minister. On April 17, 2013, the group even released a statement expressing deep concern about new restrictions on the freedom of expression in Turkey. It is hard to overstate how dramatic this break is: Gulen’s group was Erdogan’s main ally in his power struggle against the now defunct Kemalist state establishment.

Gulen’s decision to speak out did not necessarily reflect an ideological commitment to a free press — more likely, he wants to grab power from a weakened Erdogan while he can — but the criticisms nevertheless color the way the prime minister’s core constituency sees him. And even if that constituency is not about to abandon the AKP, which still represents its interests, it might abandon Erdogan. As the protests die down, religious conservatives will probably throw their weight behind Turkish President Abdullah Gul — who was one of the co-founders of the AKP but who has also become Erdogan’s rival in recent years — if he decides to stand for reelection in 2014. And that is an outcome that Erdogan has been trying to forestall.

As if the loss of some of the religious conservatives were not bad enough, Erdogan also stands to lose ground among more secular conservatives. Since his reelection in 2011, he has been pursuing an explicitly ideological Islamic agenda. He has promised to “raise a pious youth,” made an attempt to ban abortion, and overseen a drift in the education system toward religious conservatism. Recently, his government imposed new restrictions on the consumption of alcohol. Faced with an outpouring of criticism, Erdogan demonstrated his contempt for the secularists by telling them to “go and drink at home,” suggesting that there is no place in the public space for those who have preferences other than those prescribed by the government. With every such statement, Erdogan is seen as less a leader of the center.

The prime minister’s increasingly pronounced ideological bent is not something that appeals to the more casually conservative masses in Anatolia, who have traditionally rallied behind the center right for its moderate social conservatism and its emphasis on economic development. They have supported Erdogan primarily because of his apparent affiliation with that tradition, not because they crave more religion in politics. Accordingly, leading conservative commentators in pro-AKP media outlets have not hesitated to criticize Erdogan for his apparent inability to show empathy. Like their more religious counterparts, they would rather not abandon the AKP but do apparently prefer Gul, who has a reputation for moderation.

Erdogan’s own party members sense the changing tide. Indeed, even before the protests, there was widespread uneasiness within the AKP ranks. Most AKP parliamentarians had little enthusiasm for Erdogan’s plan to change the constitution and introduce an executive presidency. His scheme would have concentrated all power into the hands of a supreme leader, a position that Erdogan covets, basically neutering all other government officials. The prime minister’s handling of the protests has now made party members even more nervous. As Erdogan lashed out — calling those who took to the streets “marauders,” extremists, and foreign agents, and threatening retaliation — Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc issued an apology to the demonstrators and said that the authorities should have tried to meet their demands. Another AKP representative, Kadir Topbas, the mayor of Istanbul, admitted that the municipality had committed a grave mistake. And Gul made a principled defense of the right to protest from the outset, a reminder that voting is not the only democratic right.

It is true that Erdogan has traditionally thrived on polarization; earlier attacks on secularists have served to keep the religious conservatives mobilized behind the AKP. But this last week might be a bridge too far. As the reactions of other leading representatives of the AKP demonstrate, though, all of Erdogan’s various constituencies no longer want confrontation. They see it as a threat to the stability of Turkey, and ultimately to their hold on power. So although it is unlikely that the protests will force Erdogan to resign, it is also unlikely that he will survive the uproar with enough political capital to realize his presidential ambitions next year.

Those who assert that the protests will not bring the liberals to power are right — they are far too disorganized for that. But that does not mean that the demonstrations have not seriously hurt Erdogan. His handling of the crisis has significantly strengthened the position of his rival. Several polls have already put Gul ahead of Erdogan in a hypothetical contest for the presidency. If anything, then, it is Gul and possibly a refreshed AKP that will emerge from the scuffle in Taksim Square as the ultimate winners.

On OpenDemocracy, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Kerem Öktem, and Karabekir Akkoyunlu—from St. Anthony’s College and LSE—have an analysis of “Turkey’s protests: the limits of hubris.”

Kerem Öktem likewise has an analysis in Jadaliyya, “Contours of a new republic and signals from the past: how to understand Taksim Square.”

FWIW, leftist author and activist Ozan Tekin has an interview in Ahram Online, in which he explains that “Turkish protesters reject neo-liberalism not Islamism.” Perhaps.

Gawker, which is otherwise not known as a source for information on Turkey, says that people must “Stop calling Gezi Park a ‘small green space’.”

Following from the piece on “chapulling” in yesterday’s post, see the image below. Funny.

Rage and Ruin: On the Black Panthers

1960s activist Steve Wasserman has a most interesting review essay in The Nation on the recently published Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party, by Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin Jr., academic historians both. Wasserman, who knows the subject rather well, is critical of the book, which he says is “about as close to an official history as can be imagined.” Reading the essay brought back memories from my early ’70s gauchiste teen years, when I thought the Black Panthers were cool. I subscribed to the Black Panther Party’s official newspaper for a stretch—and remember well its exalting The Great Leader Kim Il-Sung—and, of course, read Eldridge Cleaver’s Soul on Ice (didn’t everyone?). My main memory from that is Cleaver recounting his pre-revolutionary youth, when he would rape black women as practice for raping white women. Nice.

On Cleaver, who was the BPP’s “minister of information,” Wasserman writes

Cleaver was regarded by many of the younger recruits within the party as their Malcolm X. A strong advocate of working with progressive whites, Cleaver was a man of large appetites, an anarchic and ribald spirit who relished his outlaw status. After years in prison, he was hellbent on making up for lost time and wasn’t about to kowtow to anyone—neither to Ronald Reagan, whom he mocked mercilessly, nor, as it would turn out, to Huey Newton. He was the joker in the Panther deck and a hard act to follow. Like so many of the Panthers’ leaders, he had killer looks, inhabiting his own skin with enviable ease. (The erotic aura that the Panthers presented was a not inconsiderable part of their appeal, as any of the many photographs that were taken of them show. And in this department, Huey was the Supreme Leader, and he never let you forget it.) Eldridge was the biggest mouth in a party of big mouths. He especially loved invective and adored the sound of his own voice, delivered in a sly baritone drawl. He was a gifted practitioner of the rhetoric of denunciation, favoring such gems as “fascist mafioso” and given to vilifying the United States, at every turn, as “Babylon.” He was a master of misogynist pith, uttering the imperishable “revolutionary power grows out of the lips of a pussy.” He was fond of repeating, as if it were a personal mantra: “He could look his momma in the eye and lie.” He was notorious in elite Bay Area movement circles for his many and persistent infidelities and for his physical abuse of his equally tough-talking and beautiful wife, Kathleen. About these failures, however, a curtain of silence was drawn. He was, all in all, a hustler who exuded charm and menace in equal measure.

I wasn’t too crazy about Cleaver—who, pour mémoire, converted to Mormonism in the 1980s and became a conservative Republican—but thought Huey Newton was pretty good, particularly after watching him on William Buckley’s Firing Line in 1973 (YouTube excerpt here). But Newton was as much a thug as Cleaver and which Wasserman reminds us of in quoting later published accounts of BPP members—but which Bloom and Martin leave out of their book. They leave a lot out, it seems

You won’t learn from Bloom and Martin the hard truth about Flores Forbes, a trusted enforcer for Newton, a stalwart of the party’s Orwellian “Board of Methods and Corrections,” and a member of what Newton called his “Buddha Samurai,” a praetorian guard made up of men willing to follow orders unquestioningly and do the “stern stuff.” Forbes joined the party at 15 and wasted no time becoming a zombie for Huey. Forbes was bright and didn’t have to be told; he knew when to keep his mouth shut. He well understood the “right to initiative,” a term Forbes tells us “was derived from our reading and interpretation of Wretched of the Earth by Frantz Fanon.” What Forbes took Fanon to mean was “that it is the oppressed people’s right to believe that they should kill their oppressor in order to obtain their freedom. We just modified it somewhat to mean anyone who’s in our way,” like inconvenient witnesses who might testify against Newton, or Panthers who’d run afoul of Newton and needed to be “mud-holed”—battered and beaten to a bloody pulp. Newton no longer favored Mao’s Little Red Book, preferring Mario Puzo’s The Godfather, which he extolled for its protagonists’ Machiavellian cunning and ruthlessness. Nor will you learn from Bloom and Martin how Newton admired Melvin van Peebles’s Sweet Sweetback’s Baadasssss Song, the tale of a hustler who becomes a revolutionary. Military regalia was out, swagger sticks were in. Newton dropped the rank of minister of defense. Some days he wanted to be called “Supreme Commander,” other days “Servant of the People” or, usually, just “Servant.” But to fully understand Huey’s devolution, you’d have to run Peebles’s picture backward, as the story of a revolutionary who becomes a hustler.

The political consciousness of the BPP cadres was clearly not raised during their period in Algiers, the world capital of tiersmondisme back then. For the anecdote, an Algerian-in-the-know told me stories some two decades ago about the BPP’s Algiers years (1969 to ’71 or thereabouts). The Algerians were initially thrilled to receive Cleaver and other Panthers (Algeria and the US did not have diplomatic relations at the time), who were set up in a villa in a nice neighborhood (probably Hydra) and supplied with resources, including women (i.e. prostitutes on the state payroll). But the Panthers quickly became a problem for the Algerians, with their loud parties—Algiers is a sleepy city after dark—, doing drugs, trying to pick up women in public… Instead of getting bona fide American revolutionaries, the Algerians got American urban voyous. The 1954-62 FLN had its share of voyous but also advanced political leadership. The BPP had a lot of the former but little of the latter. So the Algerian authorities quietly encouraged the Panthers to move on—and which they did (as they must have been bored out of their minds in Algiers; if one doesn’t speak French or Arabic and has little interest in Algeria, it would be a deadly dull place to live in).

The Istanbul protests – V

Today’s links.

Michael Koplow has an analysis on his indispensable Ottomans and Zionists blog on “What comes after the Turkish protests.”

Two op-eds in today’s NYT. In one, MIT economist Daron Acemoglu informs us that “Development won’t ensure democracy in Turkey.” In the other, Soner Cagaptay says that “The middle class strikes back.” Money quote:

The new middle class that the A.K.P. has built is telling its government that democracy is not just about winning elections; it is also about building consensus. And they are telling Mr. Erdogan that while they may vote for him, they do not necessarily support all his policies.

This is good news for Turkey’s future. The country has crossed a threshold — it is too middle class and too diverse to fall under a one-size-fits-all democracy. And the A.K.P. will have to listen to opposing views, even though it remains the most popular party in the country.

Turkey has become the first majority middle-class and majority Muslim society in history. Now it can become the first consolidated democracy among all Muslim countries, if Mr. Erdogan begins to respect the will of his people.

The middle class and, more generally, civil society, which is finally waking up and taking matters into its own hands, as Guardian correspondent Luke Harding reports

“In the past, the army would step in if the government abandoned secular values,” another protester, Onur Özgen, said, referencing the Turkish military’s earlier practice of staging undemocratic coups. “They can’t do it any more. Most of the generals are in jail. So people have realised they have to voice their own concerns. There is no other way to change [things] than ourselves.”

In view of the pathetic political opposition (CHP et al), Turkish civil society will need to muster all the force it has to counter the impulses of its tough guy PM. In a commentary on “The Bulldozer” (i.e. Erdoğan), journalist Michael Weiss, who has read WikiLeaks, has this titbit

America’s former ambassador to Turkey, Eric Edelman, writing what he thought was a classified memo in 2004, was at least good enough to furnish the U.S. State Department with a few prescient caveats about this natural politician, all related to deficiencies in Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s character. The then-newly elected Turkish prime minister was “seriously vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic, especially in foreign affairs, and vulnerable to attacks by those who would disrupt his equilibrium.” His pride was “overbearing.” His ambition was messianic: Erdogan believed himself “anointed” by God to lead Turkey – never a good sign in a freshman head of state. And his “authoritarian loner streak” rendered around him little more than sunken-chested yes-men incapable of controlling an outsized ego and “thin-skinned” disposition. Also, Erdogan had an incurable “distrust of women,” which is why there were none in positions of authority in the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) that he co-founded. This is also probably why heterosexual smooching on subway platforms, seven years on, is a major cause of national concern to him.

On the AKP, he has this

David Gardner of the Financial Times was clearly right when he observed: “Another way of looking at the AKP is as a party of building contractors, who have never seen anything they did not want to build, and have grown accustomed to bulldozing anything in their path.”

Some planned future bulldozing may end up not happening, as Claire Sadar speculates on the Atatürk’s Republic blog

This should be (and is) is the least of Turkey’s concerns right now, but I cannot see how the IOP will ever agree to give the 2020 Olympics to Istanbul after this weekend.

Inshallah.

In The New Yorker, Orhan Pamuk offers his “Memories of a public square” (i.e. Taksim).

And finally, FP has a post on how “Turkish protesters have invented a new verb: ‘chapul’“

Erdogan’s reference to protesters as “capulcu” (looters) has taken Twitter by storm. Turkish social media users have anglicized the word to “chapul” — and they’re bearing it proudly.

According to one Urban Dictionary definition, chapul is a verb that signifies “resistance to force” — to “demand justice” and “seek one’s right.”

Looks like it’s already gone international (though the correct French spelling would be ‘tchapuler’)

The Istanbul protests – IV

Taksim Square, Istanbul, May 28 2013 (Photo: Osman Orsal/Reuters)

Yet more links to worthy articles read over the past twelve or so hours.

Journalist Ece Temelkuran has a fine article in the New Statesman on how “People have killed their fear of authority – and the protests are growing.” The lede: What began in an Istanbul park has tapped in to years of grievances.

Political scientist Soner Cagaptay has an equally fine article in The Atlantic, on how “Turks have learned the power of grassroots politics.” His conclusion

Two factors account for the rebirth of grassroots politics in Turkey. The first is social media, which alone helped turn a pro-tree sit-in into a massive anti-government rally and has sustained it for days.

The second factor is Turkey’s new middle class. In the past decade, Turkey has become a majority middle-class society, ironically thanks to Erdogan’s successful economic policies. Now, though, this demographic majority is demanding respect for individual liberties (such as the right to assembly), and everything that comes with it, such as respect for the environment and urban heritage.

The rallies have included a number of AKP voters, suggesting that these are not the same as the old anti-AKP secular rallies. This is the Turks’ way of saying to the AKP: “We may vote for you, but it does not mean we will support all your policies.”

Now the middle-class has tasted the power of organized grassroots action, forcing Erdogan — who has nurtured a strong man image in politics — to change his mind about the park-to-shopping mall project. Even if this week’s demonstrations eventually fizzle away, grassroots activism and middle-class demands for liberties appear to have become a force of Turkish politics, thanks to a campaign to save some trees.

For his part, Turkish-American political scientist Henri J. Barkey, writing in The National Interest, weighs in on “All the Prime Minister’s yes-men.” The Prime Minister is, of course, Erdoğan.

Also in TNI is a piece by political scientist Kemal Kirişci explaining “How Erdoğan fell from grace.”

On the ICG’s Solving the EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle blog, analysts Didem Collinsworth and Hugh Pope have a useful run-down on “Turkey’s protests: the politics of an unexpected movement.”

In Al-Monitor, Emre Caliskan and Simon A. Waldman pose the question: was “Black Friday [May 31st] a turning point in Turkish history?” Response: yes, it does look that way.

On the NYT’s Latitude blog, longtime Istanbul-based journalist Andrew Finkel has a post on “Seeing the trees and the forest,” in which he observes that the protests erupted over the planned destruction of a park but they’re really about government greed and authoritarianism.

Istanbul-based journalist Piotr Zalewski has this article in Time: “Erdo-gone? After Taksim, Turkish leader’s political future may hang in the balance.” In the conclusion he discusses the growing rift between Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, noting that the latter has not yet said whether or not he intends to run for a second presidential term next year. As one knows, Erdoğan wishes take Gül’s place in ’14 and under a revised constitution that would substantially increase the powers of the presidency. How interesting it would be if Gül decided to run for a second term. If there is to be any chance of upending RTE’s political career, this would seem to be it.

Erdoğan, if one needs reminding, still remains very popular. In this vein, anthropologist Constanze Letsch, who is undertaking a study of Istanbul’s central Beyoğlu district’s Tarlabaşı neighborhood, has a piece in The Guardian explaining that “Erdoğan [is] still a hero to some, in spite of violent protests.” The lede: A stone’s throw from Taksim Square in the poor district of Kasımpaşa [whence Erdoğan hails], people still sing the prime minister’s praises.

In Slate, Istanbul journalist Cinar Kiper says much the same in a piece on “Emperor Erdoğan: Turkey’s prime minister is a popular, democratically elected leader—who rules with the back of his hand.”

En français, Le Monde Diplomatique’s Alain Gresh has an analysis of the “Vent de fronde en Turquie.”

On The Atlantic Cities site, Sarah Goodyear informs the reader of filmmaker Imre Azem’s “Scathing critique of Istanbul’s urban planning policies.”

Finally, James Dorsey has a post on his blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, on “Tahrir’s lesson for Taksim: Police brutality unites battle-hardened fans.” The sight of Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe, and Beşiktaş fans marching together in common cause is something indeed.

The Istanbul protests – III

Ankara, June 1 2013 (Photo: Adem Altan/AFP/Getty Images)

[update below] [2nd update below]

Voilà a few more links to good stuff.

The excellent analyst Sinan Ülgen has an excellent analysis on the FP website, “Erdoğan’s dilemma.” Ülgen, a former Turkish diplomat and presently at the Istanbul think tank EDAM, is one of the smartest analysts of Turkish politics (and foreign policy) around.

Also on the FP website is a commentary by the well-known columnist Mustafa Akyol, “How not to win friends and influence the Turkish people.” The lede: Turkey’s bombastic prime minister has convinced himself that just because he wins elections, he can govern the country all by himself.

Spiegel Online International has a piece by Özlem Gezer et al, “Revolt in Turkey: Erdoğan’s grip on power is rapidly weakening.” Inshallah.

UPDATE: Claire Berlinski has a must read article in City Journal, “Erdoğan over the edge.” And Seyla Benhabib of Yale University has an op-ed in the NYT on “Turkey’s authoritarian turn.”

2nd UPDATE: Dani Rodrik has a comment on his blog—the unedited version of his FT op-ed—on how “Turkey’s protests send a strong message, but will not bring democracy.” And Çağlar Keyder of Boğaziçi University has a post on the LRB blog on Erdoğan, who always speaks in the “First person singular.”

The Istanbul protests – II

Here are links to some good analyses and commentary I’ve read today on the protest movement in Istanbul and other Turkish cities.

Steven A. Cook and Michael Koplow have a first-rate analysis on the FP website asking “How democratic is Turkey?” Answer: Not as democratic as Washington thinks it is.

On the Muftah website, Zihni Özdil of Erasmus University Rotterdam explains “Why the Gezi Park protests do not herald a Turkish Spring (yet).”

Cengiz Çandar, contributing writer for Al-Monitor’s Turkey Pulse—and who witnessed the 1989 Velvet Revolution in Prague—, says that we may be witnessing “Turkey’s Velvet Revolution.”

On the new Bülent website/blog, Turkey-based journalist Alexander Christie-Miller asks: will the “Gezi Park [protests lead] towards a new political consensus?“

In an analysis (en français) dated Saturday—on the useful website Observatoire de la vie politique turque—, Turkey specialist Elise Massicard poses the question: are we witnessing “Un printemps turc?” See also the posts by Jean Marcou on the OVPT site.

The sharp Hürriyet Daily News columnist Yusuf Kanlı asks (en anglais) the same question: “Is it a Turkish Spring?“

And here are some “Heartwarming images from the Turkish Resistance.” Also this great photographic “record of Taksim Gezi Park protest meetings.”

Beyond the Hill

As Turkey has been an international news story the past few days and was the subject of my post yesterday, I should mention a couple of Turkish films I’ve seen lately. One, ‘Beyond the Hill’ (en France: ‘Derrière la colline‘), is particularly good. It’s a family drama set in the wilderness in south-central Anatolia (in the area around Ermenek), which looks like the American west. Here’s the review in Variety

An eye-catching parable about scapegoating and the multitude of sins it covers, “Beyond the Hill,” from debuting Turkish helmer-writer Emin Alper, is a deliberately paced drama set amid the scenic hills of central Anatolia. Appealing more to the intellect than to the emotions, the low-budgeter is most interesting for the way it uses the stunning landscape, at times adopting Western iconography. The powerful visuals, as well as a special mention garnered in Berlin’s first feature competition, should pique fest programmer interest.

Retired forester Faik (Tamer Levent) lives on ancestral land and displays a feudal attitude toward his secretly rebellious sharecropper Mehmet (Mehmet Ozgur). Faik believes nomads from beyond the hill are deliberately destroying his poplar trees. When his hedonist son Nusret (Reza Ozcan) and grandsons Zafer (Berk Hakman) and Caner (Furkan Berk Kiran) come to visit, Faik’s obsession with the unseen nomads masks bad behavior on the part of the other men, as well as Zafer’s mental breakdown. Romanian-born lenser George Chiper-Lillemark (“Adalbert’s Dream”) imbues the landscape with a sense of impending threat. Accomplished soundwork also builds tension, with a climactic burst of martial music driving home the parable aspect.

And this from the review in Hollywood Reporter

Beyond the Hill, an unsettling drama set in the Turkish wilderness, plays on the “something out there” fears of a small family clan united for a summer holiday. With all the action taking place off-camera, the classic horror elements give way to a highly controlled psychological drama that veers into social parable. The glancing, off-key approach chosen by first-time director Emin Alper makes the skin crawl almost from first shot to last but will also limit the film’s audience to art house tribes willing to make some mental effort to fill in plot points Alper’s script only suggests.

The influence of director Nuri Bilge Ceylan seems to be rampant in Turkish festival films, and this is one of his more successful heirs. There is the same attention to a realistic setting, psychological detail and Chekhovian interest in delving into the soul of the common man. All the important things are never said, only hinted at, and the distracted viewer can miss the whole point of the film very easily.

The influence of Nuri Bilge Ceylan is indeed apparent in the film. Also that of other Turkish auteurs, e.g. Semih Kaplanoğlu and Reha Erdem. When it comes to this kind of film—cerebral, complex, for the “art house tribes”—the Turks are strong. And director Emin Alper, who has a doctorate in history and teaches at Istanbul Technical University, is not even a professional filmmaker. See the interview with him (w/trailer) in IndieWire, plus on YouTube; also this review in Screen Daily). So if one is a member of an art house tribe, don’t miss it.

The other film seen recently was ‘Men on the Bridge‘, directed by Aslı Özge, which came out in 2009, even made it to the US in ’12, but only arrived in Paris (at the Saint-André-des-Arts) a couple of months ago. It’s a small film—originally intended to be a documentary—, about the parallel lives of three men who work around Istanbul’s Bosphorus Bridge: a bus driver who, with his wife, is striving—not too successfully—to climb into the middle class; a young lonely heart police officer searching for female companionship; and a teenage boy at the bottom of the social ladder—he had to be a Rom—trying to make ends meet, also not too successfully. Three lives in the pulsating Istanbul megalopolis. Not a film for the masses but may be seen by art house tribes. The NYT review is here and Village Voice review here.